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STATE V. WILSON: IF A DEFENDANT MARRIES A POTENTIAL 
STATE WITNESS WITH THE INTENT TO INVOKE THE SPOUSAL 
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AT UPCOMING CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS, SUCH CONDUCT IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR WITNESS TAMPERING AND 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE; THE CONVICTIONS DO NOT 
MERGE FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES.    
 
By: Meaghan Farnham 
 
          The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that lawful actions, such as 
marriage and the invocation of the spousal testimonial privilege, become 
unlawful when the defendant attempts to impede the administration of justice.  
State v. Wilson, 471 Md. 136, 167-68, 240 A.3d 1140, 1158 (2020).  Evidence 
of “corrupt means” is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for 
witness tampering and obstruction of justice when defendant married a state 
witness with the intent to preclude her testimony at upcoming criminal 
proceedings.  Id. at 145, 240 A.3d 1145. Convictions for witness tampering 
and obstruction of justice may not merge for sentencing purposes.  Id. at 145, 
182, 240 A.3d at 1145, 1167.    
     In June of 2015, Darrayl John Wilson (“Wilson”) and Raymond Posey 
(“Posey”) were separately indicted for the 2011 first-degree murder of 
Crystal Anderson (“Anderson”).  New evidence surfaced four years after 
Anderson’s murder when detectives spoke to Wilson’s girlfriend, Kearra 
Bannister (“Bannister”). Bannister claimed that Wilson advised her of his and 
Posey’s involvement in Anderson’s murder.  Wilson was incarcerated 
pending trial from July 2015 through February 2017.   
     While awaiting trial, Wilson participated in multiple phone calls and video 
visits with Bannister.  The recordings of these conversations show that 
Wilson and Bannister were organizing a marriage ceremony with the intent 
to preclude Bannister’s testimony as a state witness; the defendant never used 
the word “marriage,” spoke in codes, and sought information about 
Bannister’s role as a potential state witness.  Wilson and Bannister were 
married on February 9, 2017.  The marriage ceremony occurred just one day 
before Posey’s trial and eighteen days before Wilson’s trial date.   
     During direct examination at Posey’s trial, Bannister testified that she and 
Wilson got married for the purpose of invoking the spousal testimonial 
privilege and that she did not wish to incriminate her husband.  The trial court 
indicated that Bannister did not have such a privilege at Posey’s trial and 
directed her to respond.  Before Wilson’s trial, the State filed a motion to 
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preclude Bannister from invoking the spousal privilege, which the circuit 
court granted.  Wilson pled guilty.  He was then charged with witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice as to both his and Posey’s murder trials 
but was only found guilty of the charges pertaining to his trial.  
     The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed Wilson’s witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice convictions for lack of sufficient 
evidence to prove corrupt means.  The State appealed.  In its petition for writ 
of certiorari, the State raised the following issues: (1) whether evidence that 
the defendant-spouse married the witness-spouse to suppress testimony under 
the cloak of spousal privilege was sufficient to satisfy the “corrupt means” 
element of the witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes, and (2) 
whether a party to a collusive marriage is precluded from invoking the 
spousal testimonial privilege.  Wilson cross-petitioned for writ of certiorari.    
The court granted the state’s petition in its entirety and limited Wilson’s 
petition to: “[i]f Wilson’s convictions are affirmed, does his conviction and 
sentence for witness tampering merge into his conviction and sentence for 
obstruction of justice, where both convictions are predicated upon one act[?]”  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed whether the State had 
sufficient evidence to prove “corrupt means.” Wilson, 471 Md. at 168, 240 
A.3d at 1158.  Since the statutes neglect to define “corrupt means,” the court 
resorted to state and federal treatment of the phrase.  Id.  After evaluating the 
Maryland judiciary’s treatment of “corrupt means”, the court held that 
“engaging in otherwise lawful conduct [such as marriage] with the intent of 
precluding a state witness from testifying at a criminal proceeding may 
constitute corrupt means.”  Wilson, 471 Md. at 168, 240 A.3d at 1158 (citing 
State v. Romans, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642, 644 (1940)). Furthermore, the 
court noted the importance of intent: otherwise, lawful conduct done with the 
intent of precluding a witness from testifying at a criminal proceeding 
satisfies the corrupt means element of the statutes.  Wilson, 471 Md. at 168-
69, 240 A.3d at 1158-59 (citing Romans, 178 Md. at 588, 16 A.2d 644 
(1940)).   
     To supplement its interpretation of “corrupt means,” the court evaluated 
the federal obstruction of justice statute.  Wilson, 471 Md. at 163-64, 240 
A.3d at 1155-56 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)).  A federal comparison 
enhances the court’s understanding of “corrupt means” because Maryland’s 
original obstruction statute was identical to the federal government’s, and 
Maryland’s current obstruction statute is “still very similar[.]”  Wilson, 471 
Md. at 168-69, 240 A.3d at 1158-59.   
     The federal definition of “corrupt means” is predicated upon the malintent 
of the actor.  Wilson, 471 Md. at 168-69, 240 A.3d at 1158-59. The federal 
courts have held that although it is lawful for a government witness to invoke 
the spousal testimonial privilege, obstruction is apparent when a defendant, 
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with a corrupt motive, advises the witness-spouse to invoke the privilege.  Id. 
169, 240 A.3d at 1159.  Ultimately, the defendant-spouse’s conduct is corrupt 
when his or her motive is “self-serving.”  Wilson, 471 Md. at 169-70, 240 
A.3d at 1159 (citing United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 989 (1st Cir. 
1987); United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1119, (2nd Cir. 1974)). 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Wilson’s knowledge of 
Bannister’s status as a key state witness, his use of euphemisms or code 
language about the marriage in the recordings, and the frequency of Wilson’s 
conversations about the upcoming marriage provided the jury with sufficient 
evidence of “corrupt means.”  Wilson, 471 Md. at 173, 240 A.3d at 1161.  
The court clarified that although Bannister was precluded from asserting the 
spousal privilege at trial, Wilson’s conviction for obstruction required only 
“proof of an endeavor, irrespective of its success,” to obstruct or impede the 
administration of justice.  Wilson, 471 Md. at 174, 240 A.3d at 1162; (citing 
United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 964, 967 (4th Cir, 1979); 18 U.S.C. § 1503). 
     The court declined to address whether a party to a sham marriage may 
invoke the spousal testimonial privilege.  Wilson, 471 at 167, 240 A.3d at 
1158.  Though this issue is largely unresolved, the State did not contend that 
the marriage between Wilson and Bannister was a sham, making it a non-
issue.  Id.  
     After upholding Wilson’s convictions for witness tampering and 
obstruction of justice, the court concluded that the two sentences may not 
merge.  Wilson, 471 at 177, 182, 240 A.3d at 1164, 1167.  The court deferred 
to the plain language of the statute, which unequivocally relays the General 
Assembly’s intent “to allow separate sentences, either consecutively or 
concurrently,” for witness tampering and obstruction of justice convictions.  
Wilson, 471 Md. at 182-83, 240 A.3d at 1167 (citing CR § 9-305(d)).  The 
State referred to the witness tampering statute as an “anti-merger provision,” 
which the court ultimately endorsed.  Id. at 178, 240 A.3d at 1164.   
     Prior to the court’s ruling in Wilson, there was a valid impression that a 
defendant may marry a potential state witness with the intent of invoking the 
spousal testimonial privilege at trial.  Practitioners must properly advise their 
clients that otherwise legal acts (such as marriage and the invocation of the 
spousal testimonial privilege) become unlawful when the State can prove that 
the defendant intended to impede the administration of justice.  As a 
consequence, a defendant can face years of additional imprisonment for 
convictions of witness tampering and obstruction of justice, which do not 
have merger provisions and constitute two separate offenses.  
 
 
 
